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Abstract 
This thesis is an attempt to discuss the proposals to improve the statuses and rights of 
the legally resident third country nationals living in the European Union. As denizens, third 
country nationals have full civil and social rights but they do not have any political rights. 
This is believed to denote an anomaly, which can be corrected through the grant of political 
rights. However, political rights are reserved only for the political community’s full members, 
who are citizens. As the citizenship regimes of most of the member states have been based on 
the principle of jus sanguinis, which denotes an ethno-cultural and as a result an exclusive 
citizenship regime, the introduction of European citizenship was celebrated by the migrants’ 
representatives, political activists and academics.  
 
The findings of this study show that despite the high hopes, European citizenship can 
not provide anything for the third country nationals. On the contrary, it seems that it operates 
as legal and social exclusion mechanisms for them. In line with the developments that have 
taken place in the European citizenship regimes in the last decade, it seems that only 
liberalized national citizenship regimes can improve the statuses of the third country 
nationals.  
 
Key words: Third country nationals, denizenship, European citizenship, legal 
exclusion, social exclusion, citizenship, liberalization.  
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1 Introduction 
The European economies expanded rapidly in the post war period. However, the 
number of unskilled workers to embrace such a rapid economic growth was inadequate. This 
led European states to recruit foreign labour. At first both the migrants and the host societies 
thought that this recruitment was a temporary situation, but in the mid 1970s it became clear 
that most of the guest workers were there to stay. Today third generation immigrants are 
living in Europe and together with the first and second generation, their number exceeds more 
than 14 million.  
 
As legally resident third country nationals1, they have acquired full social and civil 
rights. However, they do not have any political rights as only citizens, who are full members 
of the political community, can have them. When the third country nationals do not have any 
political rights, they are unable to influence the political processes. But they are directly 
affected by the decisions and policies made at the national and European levels. Keeping 
more than 14 million people out of the political processes denotes an anomaly in the 
European political systems.  
 
This anomaly could not be corrected by the member state citizenship regimes as most 
of them have been formulated around the principle of jus sanguinis, which designates a 
communitarian citizenship model. The inclusiveness of the communitarian citizenship for the 
third country nationals is very low. Having thought that the European citizenship would 
correct this anomaly, migrants’ representatives, academics and political activists celebrated its 
inauguration. Besides the idea of an inclusive European citizenship, another proposal for 
improving the conditions of third country nationals is the liberalization of European 
citizenship regimes. Discussion of these proposals is the backbone of this study.  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 In this thesis, the term “third country national” refers only to the legally resident immigrants who came from a 
country other than European Union member states.  
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To make a better analysis, this study starts with examining the definition of 
citizenship, citizenship rights, citizenship models and their approach towards the third country 
nationals. The statuses of third country nationals in view of the member states citizenship 
regimes, the European citizenship and its relation with the third country nationals and lastly 
the liberalization of citizenship regimes will be discussed in separate chapters. The findings of 
the study will be outlined in the conclusion part, where the discussion of the proposals will 
also take place.  
 
1.1 Purpose and Research Questions 
The purpose of this thesis is to find a feasible proposal for the improvement of the 
rights of the third country nationals and to correct the anomaly they are living because of 
exclusion from the political processes. For that purpose the study starts with defining 
citizenship, later it continues with examining the statuses of third country nationals in the face 
of citizenship regimes and it continues with examining the most discussed proposals. During 
study the main research question asked is:  
 
How can the third country nationals acquire political rights to become equal with the 
other members of the society?  
 
The other research questions asked are: 
What is citizenship? 
How is the relationship of the European citizenship with the third country nationals? 
Can the European citizenship provide political rights for the third country nationals? 
if it can in what ways? 
Can liberalization of the European citizenship regimes improve the rights of third 
country nationals? 
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1.2 Research Material 
 
The research material used in this study can be divided into two groups: theoretical 
and empirical. For the first theoretical part, where the citizenship is examined I have used 
three edited books as my primary sources. The first one is Challenging Immigration and 
Ethnic Relations Politics (2000) by Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham, the second one is 
Challenge to the Nation-State (1998) by Christian Joppke and the last one is Towards 
Assimilation and Citizenship in Liberal Nation-States (2003) by Christian Joppke and Ewa 
Morawska. For the second empirical part, I used academic journals. For the third part where I 
discussed European citizenship, I have mostly used Rainer Bauböck and the book European 
Citizenship: National Legacies and Transnational Projects (1999) by Klaus Eder and Bernard 
Giesen for theoretical parts, for the empirical parts I have used academic journals, official 
documents of the European institutions and speeches of EU officials. 
 
 
1.3 Limitations 
 
As migration has become one of the hot topics of the last two decades, there is a 
burgeoning literature on it. The thesis is not about general patterns of migration, migrant 
integration or multiculturalism for migrants in the European societies. It is about correcting 
the political anomaly, which the legally third country nationals are in and equalizing their 
statuses with the other members of the society. As a result it is about proposals for including 
third country nationals by the citizenship regimes. In that sense the thesis deals with the 
national citizenship, citizenship models, European citizenship and its relation with the third 
country nationals, how it can include the third country nationals and liberalization of 
citizenship regimes. However, as third country nationals are established legally resident 
migrants and as all materials try to cover all aspects of migration it has become difficult to 
extract only the situation of third country nationals from those debates.  
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1.4 Plan of the Thesis 
 
The introduction will be followed by the first theoretical chapter, citizenship. In this 
first chapter, the definition of the citizenship, citizenship models and their approach towards 
the third country nationals by their nature will be told. In the second chapter the rights and 
statuses of the third country nationals will be discussed, a solution for them will also be 
proposed. The following chapter is about European citizenship, its historical evolution, the 
rights it grants, its relation with the third country nationals and the proposals to make it more 
inclusive for the inclusion of third country nationals will be discussed. The last part before 
conclusion is liberalization, where if the liberalization of third country nationals can provide 
better conditions for the third country nationals will be discussed. Here liberalization will be 
defined and the examples will be given. The last conclusion part will be the outline of the 
findings of this study. 
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2 Citizenship 
Citizenship briefly means “the relationship between the state and the individual which is 
based on reciprocal rights and responsibilities” (Heywood, 1997: 402). Citizenship is used to 
define “the rights, privileges and duties an individual possesses by virtue of belonging to a 
state” in international law (Guild quoted in Shore, 2000: 71). According to Marshall quoted in 
Feldblum (1998: 234) citizenship is a “status denoting full membership in a community to 
which are attached rights and duties”.  
 
In his groundbreaking work about citizenship, T. H. Marshall speaks about three 
different groupings of citizenship rights: civil rights, political rights and the social rights. 
Civil rights are of freedom of speech, freedom of movement, freedom of conscience, equality 
before the law and the right to own property (quoted in Bauböck, 2004, p.13). Political rights 
comprise the right to vote, the right to stand for elections and the right to hold a public office. 
Lastly, the social rights, which are defined as the rights that should provide the minimum 
social standards and status to enable the individual to live in a civilized way and take her 
place in the civil and political spheres, complement the civil and political rights (Heywood, 
1997, p.397). Having access to education in public schools, health benefits, welfare and social 
insurance schemes, unemployment fees are among the social rights (Soysal, 1994, p.123). 
These three groupings of rights complement each other. For instance as civil rights are 
necessary for individuals for free participation in the civil society; they participate in the 
political life of the community with their political rights.  
 
Individual, holding a citizenship is considered to be a full member of the political 
community and this political community is usually a nation-state (Feldblum, 1998, p.233). 
Nation-states have the authority to entitle citizenship and as a result the boundary of a nation-
state and the citizenship is generally congruent. This congruence has made citizenship as the 
basis of the nation-state membership (Hansen, 2003, p.87). As it helps nation-states to decide 
who is a member, the citizenship also lets them decide who is not. Marshall (1992, p.24) says 
that citizenship rights have developed as a common possession of the community whose 
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members are loyally tied to each other and to their civilization. It must also be kept in mind 
that citizenship can also be a way to distribute the scarce resources among nationals.  
 
As Kostakopolou (2002: 442) observes every state has different definitions for 
political membership due to its distinct historical experiences. And these different definitions 
play an important part in their approach and response to the non-citizens. These definitions 
are present in the citizenship laws in every country and “they express distinctive 
understandings of nationhood and political national self-understandings” as they are the 
results of historical experiences of nation-state formation (Atikcan, 2006: 9). 
 
Political theorists emphasize two different citizenship models: the republican and the 
communitarian2. They are both citizenship theories but they take different references while 
they are constructing their demos, the people that will be the subject of their theories.  These 
models determine whether the citizenship of the country is inclusive or not. But besides this, 
the principles that the citizenship models have been based on are also important. While the 
republican citizenship is based on the principle of jus soli; communitarian citizenship model 
is based on jus sanguinis principle (Koopmans and Statham, 2000a). These principles play 
important roles for the non-citizens as they determine the conditions of naturalization.  
 
 
2.1 Republican Citizenship Model  
 
In the republican model of citizenship, we have demos, loyal to the constitution, taking 
part in the common institutions. Citizenship as a practice is learnt by the individual as he 
passes through several phases in the society like education and taking part in the military. The 
republican model of citizenship is also labeled as ‘assimilationist’ and exemplified by France 
or by the old melting pot approach of the United States (Koopmans and Statham, 2003).  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
2 As Christian Fernandez (2003) notes, a third model of citizenship; liberal citizenship can also be added to this 
typology, but as liberalism is first of all a political theory about the individual but not the community, it is unable 
to provide much guidance while we are trying to find out the inclusiveness of the citizenship regimes and their 
demos for the third country national migrants. That is because the liberal paradigm aims to create a citizenship, 
which enables individuals (who are already citizens) “to have equal access to the processes of the organization-
be it legal rights, education or welfare entitlements” (Giesen and Eder, 2003: 5). 
  7
 
The republican citizenship has a tendency to cover all the people on the territory, in 
that sense in the words of Christian Fernandez (2003: 167) “every resident of the state has the 
potential to become a citizen, even the immigrant”. According to the model, national 
citizenship forms a civic community, which is shaped the loyalty of the citizens to the 
common political values and institutions and their residence on the territory (Koopmans and 
Statham, 2003). After a short transition period, the model embraces the new comers 
irrespective of their background. This citizenship model is thought to be highly inclusive. The 
new comers can acquire citizenship without difficulty and their children gain citizenship at 
birth by the help of the jus soli principle. 
 
While jus soli means “the right of the soil” in Latin (Merriam-Webster, 1996), in 
reality it is a feudal principle according to “which all products of the soil whether they are 
crops or people belonged to the lord” (Joppke and Morawska, 2003: 18). Today, the meaning 
that the principle carries has changed a lot, however, it must be kept in mind that jus soli 
citizenship regime has its roots in that feudal principle. The citizenship regime which is based 
on jus soli principle is considered to be a “civic-territorial regime” (Joppke, 2000: 151). 
 
Territoriality means that a person who is born in that country acquires citizenship 
automatically. All the residents have same rights in the citizenship regime although ancestors 
of some of them may be of different origin or they may have lived in a different territory 
before (Entzinger, 2000). Territoriality has an important place in the model in the sense that 
the citizenship starts where the boundary of the territory starts and ends where the territory 
ends. 
 
As it is told above the French citizenship regime is thought to be the best example of 
the republican citizenship in Europe as it is an inclusive regime (Koopmans and Statham, 
2000a). In the regime immigrants are expected to prioritize Republican values and French 
political culture over religious and cultural affiliations (Koopmans and Statham, 2000b, 
p.196). It is acceptable that immigrants are expected to give up some of their ways of doing 
things to acquire citizenship and rights in return. Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that 
this citizenship model is difference blind.  
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2.2 Communitarian Citizenship Model 
 
Unlike republican citizenship, communitarian citizenship does not have to cover all 
the people living on the territory. In this model “demos is fused less by the law and a common 
set of institutions and more by descent and the belief in a shared history” (Fernandez, 2003: 
167). Common culture, traditions and shared history are important. The “citizenship rules 
serve to recognize who belongs and who does not belong to a given people” (Giesen and 
Eder, 2003: 7). Citizenship is not thought to be a practice that can be learnt in due time as it is 
thought to be in the republican model, rather it passes from one generation to another via 
ethno-cultural ties. As a result the boundary of the citizenship ends where the ethnic group, 
which is thought to be the demos end. The border of the citizenship either does not have any 
permeability for the potential migrants or its permeability is very, very low. As a result this 
model of citizenship is thought to be highly exclusive.  
 
The communitarian citizenship model is based on the principle of jus sanguinis, which 
means “the law of the blood” in Latin (Merriam-Webster, 1996). As a citizenship principle it 
means that citizenship passes to a person by descent from a citizen parent. It is difficult to 
acquire a citizenship of a country if the regime is based on the principle of jus sanguinis, as it 
looks for a citizen parent. In the words of Koopmans and Statham (2000a: 19) “the child must 
have ethno-cultural ties to the nation” to acquire the citizenship. As a result, if a person does 
not belong to that nation, he is not going to have citizenship even if he is born and has lived 
all his life there. Until very recently German citizenship regime was the best example of this 
citizenship regime. 
 
As it can be understood, a citizenship regime based on the principle of jus sanguinis is 
difficult to access. It does not give much opportunity for the third country nationals to acquire 
because it looks for descent, which none of them can provide. On the contrary the citizenship 
regimes based on the principle of jus soli is inclusive for the third country nationals if they are 
ready to give up some of their ways of doing things and prioritize the common values. 
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3 Third Country Nationals as Denizens 
It is understandable from above that the citizenship status is reserved for the nationals. 
However, the demographic structures of the nation-states have changed a lot in the last 
decades with the migration flows. Today many non-nationals and non-citizens live in the 
European nation-states. In the beginning of the 1993, the number of the legally resident non-
EC nationals were almost 12 million. Today their number is estimated to be around 15 
million. According to Bhabha (1999: 13) third country nationals comprise “three in every 100 
European workers”. 
 
With the emergence of these foreigners3, the distinction between the citizen and the 
non-citizen is blurred. A new category within the non-citizens has emerged: aliens and 
denizens. The temporary residents are called aliens, while long-term residents, with 
permanent resident statuses have been named by Thomas Hammar as denizens (Atikcan, 
2006). As Hammar observes these long-term legal resident immigrants enjoy citizenship 
rights as “denizens” and they depend “upon the beneficent paternalistic concern of bodies 
like trade unions and churches” (quoted in Rex, 2000: 59).  
 
Denizens are not foreigners anymore but they are also not citizens of the host state. 
These people are “foreign citizens with a legal and permanent resident status in the host state” 
(Atikcan, 2006: 5). According to Hammar (quoted in Kveinen, 2002: 24) a non-citizen has to 
pass three entrance gates before he becomes a citizen and is included to the political 
community. These three different gates correspond to three different phases in the 
immigration process. The first gate is the most difficult phase: stage of entry for a short period 
by gaining lawful admission (Kauranen and Tuori, 2002). In the second gate permanent 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
3 Virginie Guiraudon (1998: 305) says that the words ‘foreigner’ and ‘non-national’ are used interchangeably to mark a 
person who is not a national of the state he is living in and anyone who does not have the full citizenship status. As 
Guiraudon diagnoses there are many different and confusing categories about these people; the concepts of ‘migrant’ or 
‘immigrant’ do not have the same meaning. Some of immigrants have already naturalized or some of them (ex-colonials) 
have always been nationals, do not cover the same people. Another confusion is about “the immigrants that have never 
immigrated” like the second-generation Turkish people living in Germany (Ibid: 305).  
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residential status and work permit is regulated and the third gate is about naturalization or 
regulating the nationality (Shachar, 2003).  
 
A foreign citizen can be said to be a denizen only after he passes to the second stage of 
this process, when he is able to acquire full residential status and work permit. For several 
reasons most of these denizens do not or can not pass to the final, naturalization stage. 
Sometimes the denizen does not want to break its legal link with the country of origin because 
of the “myth of return”. But in most of the times the reason for not acquiring the citizenship is 
the restrictive naturalization policies of the host states. In many cases it is difficult for them to 
qualify for the acquisition of citizenship. Not letting dual citizenship is also another obstacle 
because this makes denizens to make a choice between the citizenship of the country of origin 
and the host state (Kveinen, 2002).  
 
Denizens can benefit from almost all civil and social rights with their permanent 
resident statuses. They have “the right to family reunion, free access to employment (Austria, 
Ireland and Luxembourg want a work permit), entitlement to social security and social 
assistance and access to education” (Kostakopolou, 2002: 444). However in most of the 
member states they have limited political rights. Denizens can not take place in the political 
life of the country as political rights, differently from civil and social rights, are only entitled 
to the citizenship. There are however, exceptions to this rule. Rainer Bauböck (2004) says that 
most of the old 15 EU member states have granted the third country nationals the right to vote 
in the local elections. Today, third country nationals living in Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Finland can vote in local elections. In the UK, only migrants from 
Commonwealth countries other than EU citizens can vote and this creates a differentiation 
among the third country nationals living in the UK; the ones with a right to vote in local 
elections and the ones without it.  
 
Similar to UK, third country nationals from only certain countries can vote in the local 
elections of Spain and Portugal. These countries are the former colonies of Portugal and 
Spain. Third country nationals can not vote in Austria but Vienna City Parliament ruled out in 
2002 that all foreign nationals who have been living in Vienna for five years can vote in 
district elections (Jenny, Zucha and Hofinger, 2004). The Italian and French governments also 
wanted to extend voting rights of the third country nationals in local elections in 1998 and 
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2000 respectively, however they failed because of the opposition and the constitutional 
constraints (Bauböck, 2004). 
 
Another restriction of franchise is that some member states let their denizens vote in 
the local elections but they do not let them stand as candidates in the elections. Bauböck 
(2004: 13) says that this conflicts with “a general democratic principle that voters can only be 
represented by other voters like themselves, not by special class of persons who monopolize 
the right to hold public offices”.  
 
On the other hand in none of the Member States can third country nationals participate 
in the national elections. Important decisions are always made at the national level. For 
instance national budget, country’s immigration and minority policies are all decided by the 
national government. Furthermore, national government sends its members to the European 
Union, Ministers from government represent the Member State in the Council of Ministers 
and the Commissioners are appointed by the national governments. Third country nationals 
are believed to be “de facto” members of the society in the words of J.M. Sorensen (quoted in 
Atikcan, 2006: 14) as “they pay taxes, participate in the labour market, bring up families, 
contribute and receive welfare benefits and involve in the social and cultural life”. However, 
when they can not vote they do not have any say over how the money is spent, how these 
policies should be amended or how their statuses can be ameliorated.  
 
This situation conflicts with the liberal values that the European states respect. It must 
also be kept in mind that an inclusive citizenship regime is also an indicator of the standard of 
a democratic state. Although the denizenship status seems to solve the problems, keeping a 
part of the populace out of the political process means weakening of the legitimacy of a 
democratic rule in that state. As a consequence, “inclusion of these people by the citizenship 
regimes in the long-run is a necessity” (Bauböck, 2004: 3). 
 
Furthermore as again Bauböck (Ibid: 4) observes,  “where third country nationals are 
excluded from citizenship in the host state, the migrants form an ethnic underclass whose 
exclusion contributes to deteriorating standards in employment, housing, health and 
education”. Citizenship can not solve these problems alone, however, it is accepted that it is a 
necessary condition in fighting these problems.  
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As a result, today the third country nationals benefit from the civil and social rights of 
the citizenship by the help of their denizen status. However, denizenship must be thought as a 
temporary status on the road to citizenship. That is because only citizens can become the full 
members of the society, only they can have political rights, which are crucial in exercising 
civil and social rights and only a citizen can be exempt from deportation. Denizen third 
country nationals must acquire political rights to be able defend their rights and interests. 
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4 European Citizenship and the Third 
Country Nationals 
4.1 European Citizenship 
 
In 1991, the Article 8 of the Treaty on European Union has said that “Citizenship of 
the Union is hereby established” and added that “every person holding the nationality of a 
Member State shall be a citizen of the Community” (Treaty on European Union, 1993). The 
following articles 8a, 8b, 8c, 8d and 8e arrange the content of the European citizenship.  
 
As it is defined above, with having different connotations in different national 
contexts, the citizenship understood in its classical form, means “the relationship between the 
state and the individual, which are based on reciprocal rights and responsibilities” (Heywood, 
1997: 402) and it is thought to be “a status denoting full membership in political community 
which is usually a nation-state (Feldblum, 1998: 234). As a result the words nationality and 
citizenship are generally used interchangeably by the academics as if they are the different 
sides of a coin. According to the Wiener (1997) the most important difference between the 
European citizenship and classical citizenship is the lack of nationality in the former. There is 
no European national identity, which according to Wiener makes the use of the concept of 
citizenship problematic within the framework of the European Community.  
 
Furthermore, as another difference of the European citizenship from the classical 
citizenship, academics have often mentioned the nonexistence of any duties or responsibilities 
associated with the citizenship. These duties or responsibilities are considered as participation 
in political life and taking arms when it is necessary for the defense of the country. After the 
Second World War, with the establishment of the welfare states in Europe, new 
responsibilities; to work, to pay taxes and to take place in military service have been added to 
this list (Shore, 2000; Komurculer, 2006). 
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Rather than responsibilities the European citizenship is more about rights. It is 
crystallized around the principle of free movement. Therefore the rights it brings focus on the 
mobility of the worker in the first place (d’Oliveria, 1993, p.81). EU citizenship entitles:  
 
• “The right to move and reside freely within the EU 
• The right to vote for and stand as a candidate at municipal and European Parliament elections 
in whichever Member State and EU citizen resides 
• Access to the diplomatic and consular protection of another Member State outside the EU 
• The right to petition to the European Parliament and to complain to the European Ombudsman 
• The right to contract and receive response from any EU institution in any one of 12 languages  
• The right to access Parliament, Commission and Council documents under certain conditions  
• The right to non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality within the scope of Community 
Law 
• The guarantee of fundamental rights as upheld by the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 
• Protection from discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual discrimination 
• Equal access to community service” (European Union Citizenship, European Union Rights, 
2003, par. 2).  
 
The main reason for the introduction of European citizenship is “to create an ever 
closer union among the peoples of Europe” (CEC, 1992: 3). According to many academics it 
was the result of the integration which has started to touch to the economic and social rights 
of individuals (Kostakopolou, 1998; Geddes, 1995). According to the supporters of this view 
the introduction of the Union citizenship became necessary both for the protection of 
individuals and for the establishment of a European civil society. As Atikcan (2006: 2) also 
observes, with the increase in the competences of the European Union, it became necessary to 
bring the European Union to the ordinary people and back it up with a kind of popular 
legitimacy. 
 
Today many academics accept that the Union Citizenship does not bring anything new 
rather than a new name for a bunch of existing rights for the Member State citizens, “ a nice 
blue ribbon around scattered elements of a general notion of citizenship” in the words of 
d’Oliveira (1993: 81). Closa and Welsh (quoted in Shore, 2000: 76) say that they see the 
introduction of new rights to be enlarged in the future indicating that the Union citizenship 
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may have a political character in the future. However the general view is that most of the 
rights given by the European citizenship already existed or the difference is so slight to bring 
an important consequence.  
 
When the Article 8 of the Treaty on European Union says that “every person holding the 
nationality of a member state shall be a citizen of the Union”, it makes it clear that only the 
nationals of the member states can become European citizens (Treaty on European Union, 
1993: p. 8). The third country nationals are left outside the framework of European 
citizenship. However, European citizenship has had important impacts on the third country 
nationals. In the following sections how the European citizenship operates as legal and social 
exclusion mechanisms for the third country nationals and the proposals to make the European 
citizenship more inclusive to include the third country nationals will be discussed.   
 
 
4.2. European Citizenship as a legal exclusion  
 
The European Union and the European integration have often been taken as a 
challenge to the national sovereignties of the Member States in the fields of migration and 
ethnic relations. The introduction of European-level human rights codes, the European Court 
of Justice and the embryonic European citizenship have been interpreted as elements limiting 
the powers of the member states and guaranteeing the migrants’ basic rights by many 
academics (d’Oliveria, 1993; Lahav, 2004).  In their minds, people have always associated 
European integration with liberal values which most of them believe bring more rights to the 
migrants.  
 
However, this is actually where, the European Citizenship receives the harshest criticism. 
With the definition of the European citizen in Art.8 of the EC Treaty, which says that “every 
person holding the nationality of a member state shall be a citizen of the Union” (Treaty on 
European Union, 1993), access to the European citizenship “depends on the rules for 
acquisition, transmission and loss of various national citizenships” (Bauböck, 1997: 12). 
When the acquisition of a member state nationality becomes the most important qualifier for 
the European citizenship, 12-13 million Third Country Nationals are excluded from the 
benefits of the European citizenship (Atikcan, 2006).  
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As it is told above, when the third country nationals can not become the citizens of 
Europe, they can not benefit from the rights, which the European citizenship introduces, other 
than the right to petition to the European Parliament and the right to complain to the European 
Ombudsman (Bhabha, 1999). Freedom of movement for workers is the most important 
promise that the EU has given and free movement of persons is the most important right of 
the European citizenship, around which the other rights crystallize. However, since the last 
couple of years, third country nationals had to take visas while they were entering to another 
member state. With the latest amendments, this was partly corrected; they can enter and travel 
within the Schengen area for a period of up to three months without a valid visa (European 
Commission, 2003). However, after three months, they have to return to their country of 
residence to reenter the Schengen area and they can not “apply for work, education or start a 
business on equal terms with European citizens” in a member state other than their country of 
residence (Fernandez, 2003: 169). 
 
European citizenship lacks any foundation for the betterment of the migrant rights at 
present. It is obvious that it is a derivative of and additional to national citizenships of the 
Member States and as a result it can not provide anything for the third country nationals. On 
the contrary, the European citizenship is believed to deteriorate the statuses of these people 
(Rostek & Davies, 2006). According to Faist (1995, p.192) the statuses of most of the third 
country nationals were approximate to those of the citizens, but now they find themselves in a 
second class position. According to Bauböck (1997) the European citizenship lowered their 
statuses to a third class citizenry, while putting immigrants/migrants coming from other 
European countries to the second class. Now a new category within migrants is existent: 
European migrants and non-European migrants that provides ground for the discrimination of 
third country nationals. 
 
Jacqueline Bhabha (1999: 16) also takes attention to the legal exclusion of third 
country nationals and says that “the member states have been able to protect their traditional 
sovereign prerogatives over the questions of citizenship by deciding to grant the European 
citizenship on the basis of member state nationality”. The eligibility for the acquisition of 
nationality differ in every member  state they may look for the place of birth, descent, 
ancestry, with a range of linguistic, cultural or other legal qualifiers (ibid, 1999).  
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The authority to determine the nationality and national citizenship is still at the hands 
of member states. As it is told above the third country nationals are denizens and while they 
have civil and social rights, they do not have any political rights as only full citizens can have 
political rights. To be able to benefit from the political rights of the European citizenship, 
which are the right to vote and stand as candidates in the local and European Parliament 
elections, the third country nationals must naturalize first. However, member states have very 
different citizenship and naturalization rules from each other. This creates another criticism 
for the European citizenship, which in the end has negative consequences for the third country 
nationals. Rainer Bauböck (1997: 11) asks “how can 27 different procedures of admission 
lead to a single and common status of citizenship?”.  
 
The answer shows the limits of European citizenship. Different naturalization policies 
create anomalies. Here are some illustrations of them:  
 
In the beginning of the 1990s Italy began to let people of Italian ancestry living in the 
South America have Italian citizenship. These people did not have to live for a certain period 
of time in Italy. Many Argentineans and Brazilians who have roots in Italy applied for 
citizenship, and they were not only interested in Italian passports but also in European 
passports which would let them migrate to Spain, England or even to the US. Italy is not the 
only Member State which provides unlimited access to its citizenship via descent. Seven of 
the old Member States and all the new Members let their emigrants maintain, transfer or 
reacquire their citizenship by descent from one generation to another without asking for a 
certain period of residence requirement (Bauböck, 2006).  
 
In 2004 the European Court of Justice decided positively in the case of Man Levette 
Chen, a Chinese mother, whose claim was for residence in the United Kingdom. Ms. Chen 
had lived in the UK with a residence permit, however during this period she got pregnant and 
went to Belfast to give birth to her baby. Here it must be noted that at that time the Republic 
of Ireland has started to entitle automatic citizenship to anyone born in anywhere in the island. 
As a result, Chen’s baby acquired an Irish and a European citizenship by birth and Ms. Chen 
automatically got the right to stay in the UK as she has become the caregiver of a European 
citizen. Later a referendum was held in the Republic of Ireland to abolish the automatic 
acquisition of citizenship by birth as the Irish people became afraid of ‘birth tourism’ by third 
country nationals (Tryfonidou, 2005). 
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The example of Turkish brothers, one of whom goes to Germany, the other to Sweden 
in the 1960s, is often given. While Brother A, who has lived all his life in Germany after 
migration, can not have any political rights in the German society, the Brother B, who has 
been able to become a Swedish citizen after five years of legally residence is a full member of 
Swedish society with political rights. Furthermore Brother B and his children are European 
citizens as the union citizenship is a derivative of the member state citizenships. The anomaly 
in this picture is this: when they visit their cousins in Germany, Brother B’s children can vote 
in the European Parliament elections and the local elections in Germany although their 
cousins, who were born; have lived all their life in Germany and probably can only speak 
German, can not vote in the local elections (Fernandez, 2003). Or think of another Turkish 
family whose members settle in different member states again. One of the sisters migrates to 
Belgium, where she acquires citizenship only after three years of legally residence. Now as a 
European citizen, she can join her sister in Austria, where she will be able to vote in the 
European Parliament and local elections. While at the same time her sister will not be able to 
participate in the political life of the country she lives in as she has to wait for ten years before 
she can apply to acquire citizenship (Bauböck, 2006). It is indeed difficult to understand why 
should a European citizen who has just moved to another EU state have a right to vote in a 
local election while a third country national, born in that member state is excluded from 
participating in political process of his own city? 
 
Another problem is that there is a tension between freedom of movement and national 
self-determination of citizenship for the third country nationals. Normally migrants can not 
have the right to move freely more than 3 months within the European Union. Even if they 
had the right to move freely, this would impose an obstacle for their future because of the 
current arrangements. If migrants moved freely, they would never have the chance to become 
European citizens as almost all Member States look for certain time of continuous residence 
for naturalization.  
 
As a result, by excluding third country nationals legally, the European citizenship 
seems to aggravate the existing anomalies in the treatment of the third country nationals. As it 
is a derivative of national citizenships, it fails to provide any political rights and any rights 
that grow out of the right to free movement. It lowered their statuses to the third class 
citizenry from second class and it has put European citizens to the second class. Furthermore 
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while it is acquired via national citizenships, and naturalization policies of member states vary 
a lot, it creates inequalities even among the third country nationals themselves in their access 
to European citizenship. 
 
 
4.3. European Citizenship as a social exclusion  
 
As it is told in the first chapter, the citizenship is also a membership. The individual 
holding the citizenship of a polity is considered to be a full member of that political 
community, which means that the citizenship also works as a conception and decides who is a 
member and who is not. As a result, every citizenship regime is exclusive by nature because it 
defines who is ‘in’, and from this definition who is ‘out’ is also defined. From this, it is 
understandable that who is ‘in’ in the box of the European citizenship is ‘every person 
holding the nationality of a member state’ (Art. 8, TEU).  
 
Dominique Schnapper (1997) says that European citizenship upsets with its definition 
which takes national citizenship as the reference point. Bhabha (1999: 15) says that by doing 
this the European citizenship failed to “provide an inclusive basis for belonging in Europe”, 
as citizenship laws differ in member states. Moreover according to O’Keefe (quoted in 
Bhabha, 1999: 16) the European citizenship “established a unitary basis for exclusion rather 
than a coherent set of criteria for inclusion”. According to Kostakopolou (2002: 445) “a rare 
opportunity was missed for subjecting the member states’ definition of ‘who makes up the 
European people’ to a normative test and for building an inclusive democratic polity which 
respects the other and gives all its residents a stake in the success of the project of its post-
national democracy”.  
 
European citizenship’s exclusion of third country nationals has important conclusions 
for the membership in Euro-polity (Atikcan, 2006: 3). That is because European citizenship 
provides the most important definition for the identity of the European polity. The European 
identity understood from this definition is a one “that is based primarily on national 
understandings, ethnic lineage or civic status rather than on recognition of globalized nature 
of Europe’s new population base” (Bhabha, 1999: 18).  
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As Fernandez (2003: 172) observes differently from legal exclusion, “social exclusion 
operates indirectly and implicitly through the promotion of identities which are incompatible 
with certain groups of people”. In the case of European citizenship, according to Hansen 
(2000, p.139) the discourse of the European citizenship has been increasingly based on an 
ethno-cultural understanding of citizenship and identity. The main elements of the European 
citizenship and identity discourse have become the European traditions and cultural heritage 
(Fernandez, 2003). Shared culture, heritage, history and civilization are the important 
concepts that the European Commission and the European Parliament have used in their 
reports about European citizenship (Bhabha, 1999). According to former Commission 
President Jacques Santer “the sources of the European common cultural heritage –the heritage 
of the Western mind and heritage - are Greek, Latin and Judeo-Christian” (quoted in Hansen, 
2000: 153). In a similar vein, the European Parliament wrote in one of its reports that the 
European culture of today is a continuity of ‘classical culture and Christianity (ibid). In a 
speech made in European Parliament, former Commission President Romano Prodi said that 
“Christianity constituted the common consciousness of European integration” (Prodi, 1999). 
Other important cultural and historical developments like “the Renaissance, the 
Enlightenment, modern science, Industrial Revolution, the worldwide dissemination of 
European currents of thought during the nineteenth century” are also visited in the formation 
of European citizenship (Hansen, 2000: 156). 
 
It must be noted that the discourse of the European identity and the European 
citizenship does not aim to exclude the third country nationals. However, the way they are 
defined prevents third country nationals’ identification with the European institutions. When 
the discourse of the European citizenship is based on the Christianity and other ethno-cultural 
qualifiers, the citizenship turns out to be highly exclusive. As a result under these 
circumstances, in the words of Fernandez (2003: 174),” it is very difficult for a non-white and 
non-Christian first generation immigrant to identify himself with a community which seeks 
identity in descent and Christianity”.  
 
As a result besides operating as a legal exclusion mechanism, the European citizenship 
operates as a social exclusion mechanism, too.  
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4.4. How can European Citizenship include the Third 
Country Nationals? 
 
Academics and Migrants Associations have suggested a variety of proposals to make 
the European citizenship more inclusive to include the third country nationals and correct this 
anomaly. The most discussed suggestions have become to reformulate the European 
citizenship on the basis of residence, the harmonization of Member States’ naturalization 
policies and expanding the rights of the third country nationals via the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Justice. 
 
4.4.1. A European Citizenship based on residence 
 
One of the most discussed suggestion is separating European citizenship from its 
basis; the national citizenship. In this view, the European citizenship would be based on 
territorial residence and it would be granted to all third country nationals who legally resided 
in one member state (within the European Union) for at least five years (Oger, 2003; Hansen, 
1998).  
 
Taha Mellouk from the Migrants Forum says that their aim is to work for the 
acquisition of European citizenship by third country nationals. He says that they see it as a 
way to guarantee certain rights for the long- term residents, which may lead to full citizenship 
in due time (Schuster and Solomos, 2002: 15). 
 
This model of European citizenship would only give “certain basic of rights of 
political participation, welfare entitlements, educational benefits” (Giesen and Eder, 2003: 9). 
Local and national rights, which are different in every member state or in the city or place of 
residence, will complete these rights. In this model basic rights are provided by the 
supranational polity; they are decoupled from the national level of citizenship and by this way 
the citizenship regimes will include the denizens. However, this would be a very radical 
arrangement which would turn the European Union into a federation like the US or Germany 
and it is hard to believe that such a move can take the support of the people (Bauböck, 2006).  
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Likewise, in none of the four national contexts, where this model was raised as a 
discussion point by the migrants’ representatives, could the model find any support to become 
an alternative to national citizenship (Schuster and Solomos, 2002).  
 
4.4.2. Harmonization of Member States’ Naturalization Policies 
 
Another alternative for the inclusion of the third country nationals by the European 
citizenship is seen as the harmonization of naturalization policies of the member states. In this 
context harmonization refers to the “legal process of standardization” (Leach, 2006: 2). In a 
number of areas, “EU reregulatory policies harmonize existing national regulations into a 
single, European regulatory framework” (Hix, 2005: 260) and when “national laws are 
harmonized they are made consistent across the EU” (EUABC, 2007). The harmonization of 
naturalization policies means that the requirements for the acquisition of national citizenship 
will be same in all member states. As a result, the access conditions for the European 
citizenship via national citizenships would be unified.  
 
In that way, the member states would continue to control the access to their citizenship 
and the citizenship law, however perhaps with the harmonization made on a liberal definition, 
the citizenship law would be more inclusive for the third country nationals (Hansen, 1998).  
 
There are several obstacles for this proposal. First of all, as it is told above, citizenship 
has “different connotations” in different national contexts (Schnapper, 1997: 201) due to 
distinct historical experiences of nation-state formation. Citizenship rules of the states can be 
thought as the written form of those experiences and they reflect the political self-
understanding of those nations (Atikcan, 2006). That is why the citizenship rules of every 
member state are different and member states would simply prefer to keep this difference. 
Besides the definitions and self understandings, member states have different approaches to 
the principles of jus sanguinis and jus soli and they have different adjustments for the citizens 
from the former colonies. As a result it is very unlikely that the member states would transfer 
competence to the European institutions in this realm so the proposal for the harmonization of 
naturalization law to make the European citizenship more inclusive for the third country 
nationals seems to fail.  
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4.4.3. Jurisprudence of European Court of Justice  
 
Another alternative to make European citizenship more inclusive is thought to be the 
enhancement of third country nationals’ political rights by the European Court of Justice. It is 
argued that the European Court of Justice can do this by using its competence over the 
interpretation of the term ‘worker’. Ziedalski (2000; 619) notes that Article 48 of the Rome 
Treaty does not define the term ‘worker’. It is left to the interpretation of the European Court 
of Justice. The Court mentioned that the term was to be a European Economic Community 
concept and took its determination from the hands of national governments.  
 
The Court has provided a comprehensive definition for the term ‘worker’ in its 
judgement for the Deborah Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden Württemberg case in 1986. 
According to this definition the worker is “any person performing for remuneration work the 
nature of which is not determined by himself for and under the control of another, regardless 
of the legal nature of the employment relationship” (European Court of Justice, 1986: 1). This 
definition is thought to be a very expansive one. The European Court of Justice could not 
change the content of the European citizenship or it could not intervene to the naturalization 
policies of the member states, however, by granting enhanced political rights to the third 
country nationals because of their worker statuses, it could open the back door of European 
citizenship to them (Hansen, 1998). 
 
However, what the Advocate General Mancini stated in another case brought before 
the Court before the Deborah Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden Württemberg is helpful in 
understanding the approach of the Court to this issue. In the judgement of that case (1983, C- 
238/83) the Advocate General Mancini stated that:  
 
“The ‘workers’ referred in the Article 48 of the Rome Treaty must be Community 
citizens. The article itself confirms it. In any event there is no doubt that the authors of 
the Treaties of Paris and Rome intended to limit freedom of movement to citizens of 
Member States: see the express provisions to that effect in Article 69 of the ECSC Treaty 
and Article 96 of EAEC Treaty. It follows that Article 48 can not be applied either to a 
national of a non-member country or to a student”  
 
Only after a couple of years from the handling of these cases by the European Court of 
Justice, Council of the European Communities issued a Resolution in 1985 on guidelines for a 
Community policy on migration (Council Resolution 85/C/186/04), which said that “the 
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presence of population groups from third countries is becoming more and more permanent” 
and told that the “matters relating to the access, residence and employment of migrant 
workers from third countries fall under the jurisdiction of governments of the member states” 
(Council of the European Communities, 1985: 4). In that sense the Resolution made it clear 
that the power of the European Court of Justice about the third country nationals was limited.  
 
As Randall Hansen (1998: 757) observes these explicit limits on the powers of the 
European Court of Justice in dealing with matters about the third country nationals have also 
eliminated the chance of “ECJ-created path to political citizenship” for third country 
nationals. As a conclusion it can be said that like the other two alternatives for making the 
European citizenship more inclusive for the third country nationals, this alternative also fails 
in bringing better conditions.  
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5 Liberalization 
In several dictionaries liberalization means “to make liberal”, “to progress or reform as 
in political or religious affairs” and “relaxation of previous government restrictions usually in 
areas of social or economic policy” (Merriam Webster, 1996; Random House Unabridged 
Dictionary, 2006). ‘Liberalization of a citizenship regime’ in this context refers to make a 
citizenship regime of a country more inclusive to be able to cover a heterogeneous society, by 
introducing amendments in the citizenship laws, which base the regime more on the principle 
of jus soli and break its link with a specific ethno-cultural group. 
 
Citizenship laws of the EU Member States had been stable. In his groundbreaking 
study Rogers Brubaker (Escobar, 1996) examines French and German citizenship regimes and 
he finds out that their approaches to the immigration are directly related with their traditions 
of state-building and national identity. Rogers Brubaker has argued that citizenship policies of 
France and Germany have been shaped by their national culture and therefore they are 
reluctant to change. However, with the establishment of the second and third generation 
immigrants in Europe, the European societies have become more heterogeneous. In the words 
of Follesdal (1998: 13) “the look and sound of Europeans are changing” and migration 
challenges exclusive citizenship regimes of the member states (Joppke, 2000). In her famous 
article The European Debate on Citizenship, Dominique Schnapper (1997) attracts attention 
to the contradictory status of third country nationals and in accordance with the main 
argument of this thesis; she says that the national citizenships must be expanded to cover 
foreigners: 
 
“Giving the right to reside and guaranteeing civil, economic and social rights 
without granting the right to vote and to participate in political life, means creating 
second class citizens who, unlike others can not defend their rights and interests through 
political action. Principles of equality and liberty must apply to all, foreigners 
included…. the citizenship must be expanded to foreigners” (Ibid: 206). 
 
 
Almost all of the EU member states’ citizenship regimes were based on the jus 
sanguinis principle and they were exclusive for the non-citizens. As it is told in the first 
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chapter, a citizenship regime based on jus sanguinis only lets the citizenship be acquired via 
blood ties. None of the migrants have descent of blood, which means that second and even the 
third generation immigrants will be foreigners in their country of birth. 
 
Today almost all academics accept that the third country nationals must be included by 
the political communities in which they are living. For this they have to become full 
members; citizens of those political communities. This can be achieved if the exclusive 
citizenship regimes of the member states are liberalized. If the exclusive regimes are 
reformulated around the principle of jus soli, in a way the nationality will be separated from 
the acquisition and exercise of citizenship. This will the make the citizenship regime more 
inclusive for the third country nationals; who are the immigrants that have never immigrated 
in most cases (Feldblum, 1998).   
 
As third country nationals do not have political clout citizenship laws have been never 
or rarely brought under discussion. However, the last decade has witnessed liberalization 
efforts in the citizenship laws of the member states. One by one, citizenship regimes of the 
member states have started to conform to the fact that they are transforming to countries of 
immigration. In the words of Rainer Bauböck (2006: 12) “the most pronounced liberal trend 
concerns the introduction of jus soli”.  
 
In 1999 Germany changed its citizenship regime and introduced jus soli. By January 
2000, individuals born in Germany from foreign parents that have legally resided there at 
least eight years are entitled to citizenship automatically at birth (Münch, 2001, p.107). With 
this new amendment German citizenship is now more inclusive than the French citizenship, in 
which automatic citizenship to a new born baby is only given if he has a parent born in the 
country (Feldblum, 1998).  
 
Several EU Member States followed Germany and introduced amendments to their 
citizenship regimes. For instance Belgian citizenship policy was revised in 2000 and now any 
legally resident foreigner can become a Belgian citizen with a simple declaration (Martiniello 
and Rea, 2003). In 2001, Luxembourg reduced the period of residence from ten to five years 
(Kollwelter, 2007) and Sweden revised its citizenship regime to allow dual citizenship 
(Gustafson, 2005). In 2003, Finland followed Sweden in letting dual citizenship. Lastly 
Portugal extended its citizenship for second and third generation immigrants in 2006. Third 
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generation with a parent born in Portugal acquires citizenship automatically at birth, while the 
second generation acquires citizenship with a simple declaration if one of the parents legally 
resided in Portugal for five years. The new law also created an opportunity for the first 
generation immigrants to acquire Portugese citizenship if they have clean criminal records 
and can speak Portugese (Queiroz, 2007). Italy, which has had one of the strictest citizenship 
policies among the EU Member States, is discussing a draft law which will ease citizenship 
laws if it is accepted. Now it takes 15 years for a migrant to become a citizen in Italy (Jasch, 
2006). Greek policy for citizenship is considered to be the most restrictive one and it seems 
unlikely to expect a change in the policy soon. However, as one of the old emigrant countries, 
Spain is expected to make an amendment in its citizenship policy to strengthen elements of 
jus soli. 
 
All these liberalizations strengthened jus soli in the European citizenship regimes. 
Pure jus sanguinis regimes have been left as they have become anachronistic and pure jus soli 
regimes were modified, in the case of Ireland in 2005, to shield against new waves of 
migration (Joppke, 2003). They have reduced the period of residence and other requirements 
for acquisition of citizenship or they have let new citizens retain their former nationality 
(Bauböck, 2006). However this liberalization trend is not without exceptions. For instance 
Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg still do not let new citizens 
hold their former citizenships. Furthermore, the Netherlands amended its citizenship laws in 
2003 and left a more liberal regime (Keeney Nana, 2007) 
 
Interesting enough in some cases the principle of jus soli may not be inclusive enough. 
It is told that jus soli fails to provide citizenship to the “so-called generation 1.5” (Bauböck, 
2006: 17). The ‘generation 1.5’ are the children who were born abroad but have immigrated 
with their parents when they were still very young, or who have joined their parents later. For 
these cases Swedish citizenship laws provides the most inclusive regime. A child who does 
not hold Swedish citizenship acquires Swedish citizenship by notification of her parents who 
have legally resided in the country for five years (Act on Swedish Citizenship, 2001). 
Furthermore Citizenship regimes based on pure jus soli can not distinguish people who give 
birth on the country’s territory as a strategic move as in the case of Levette Chen. 
 
Today the principles of jus soli and jus sanguinis are combined in most of the Member 
States’ citizenship regimes. In these countries, for the child to have the citizenship of the 
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country, one of the parents must be a legal resident for a certain period of time or the parent 
himself must be born in the country too. In some countries, the child acquires the citizenship 
only after she reaches to a certain age but not immediately at birth on the territory (Feldblum, 
1998).  
 
These new reforms clearly signal a deviation from the exclusive ethno-cultural 
conception of citizenship. Besides the introduction of jus soli elements, member states have 
also added citizenship tests to naturalization policies. These tests, which are applied in 
Austria, Greece, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom at present, are 
about country’s history, constitution and every day culture (Koopmans and Statham, 2003).  
The tests have become important in the citizenship debate about whether their introduction is 
problematic or meaningful. For the purpose of this thesis entering into this discussion will not 
provide anything, however, whether good or bad, the introduction of these tests along with jus 
soli elements is an indicator that citizenship is no longer attached to ethnic identity and 
descent. In a way it becomes a reward for the people who can communicate in the country’s 
language, who can earn his living, identify himself with the culture, history and values of the 
host society (Bauböck, 2006).  
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6 Conclusion 
Today third country nationals are not invisible in the European societies any more. They 
have settled in Europe and their number is estimated to be more than 14 million. As residents 
of member states, they are directly affected by the policies made both in national and 
European levels. However, they are unable to have any say on those policies or defend their 
rights and interests through political action because they are denizens of national citizenships 
and “they are invisibles of European citizenship” (Fernandez, 2003: 174).  
 
With their denizen statuses, third country nationals can benefit from the social and 
civil rights components of the citizenship rights; however they are deprived of political rights, 
which are crucial for any person in exercising his social and civil rights. Denizenship status is 
a temporary solution. It must be seen; as “a step towards equal membership and full 
participation”; as a stop in the road of citizenship (Kostakopolou, 2002: 450).  
 
Today almost all academics working on the third country nationals in Europe, say that 
these people must be included by the political communities they are living in. The only way 
for their inclusion is to complement their social and civil rights with political rights, in other 
words, the only way for their inclusion is their becoming citizens of those political 
communities.  
 
When the European citizenship was first introduced, the academics and migrants’ 
representatives hoped that it might include third country nationals too and provide political 
rights for them. As a result the anomaly, in which the third country nationals are in, would be 
corrected by the citizenship of the European polity. However, on the contrary, the European 
citizenship deteriorated the conditions of third country nationals by operating as legal and 
social exclusion mechanisms for them. When this was the result several propositions have 
been put forward to make the European citizenship more inclusive for the third country 
nationals. The three most discussed proposals, basing the European citizenship on residence, 
harmonization of naturalization laws of the member states and the enhancement of the rights 
of the third country nationals via European Court of Justice Jurisprudence are discussed in 
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this thesis. The findings of this discussion show that all of these proposals are unlikely to take 
place because of the member states’ national sovereignty concerns. Like many academics 
Rostek and Davies (2006: 1) observe that member states want to maintain their exclusive 
competence in deciding who will be their citizens and as a result they will “jealously guard 
their roles as gate keepers” of the European citizenship. When this is the case, in line with the 
arguments of this thesis, it becomes obvious that European citizenship can not provide 
anything for the third country nationals unless the member states want it. Member states have 
made it clear that the only way for the acquisition of European citizenship, is the acquisition 
of a citizenship of a member state.  
 
As a result, it seems that third country nationals can only become equals with the other 
members of the society they are living in, via the acquisition of citizenship of that member 
state. However, when it is considered that the principle of jus sanguinis, which denotes an 
exclusive ethno-cultural citizenship regime especially for those who do not have any ethnic 
ties to the nation, has an important role in the European citizenship regimes and dual 
citizenship is not permitted in most of them, the acquisition of citizenship by the third country 
nationals seems difficult. If the citizenship regimes of the member states are liberalized or in 
other words, if they are reformulated around the principle of jus soli and as a result their link 
with a specific ethnic group is broken, they will become more inclusive and they will be able 
to cover all the people living in European societies, which have become more heterogeneous 
with the establishment of the third country nationals.  
 
As a result it can be said that the rights of the third country nationals can not be 
improved by the European citizenship, but only by the liberalization of the European 
citizenship regimes. The developments that have taken place in the last decade seem to be in 
line with this argument. One by one the member states have started to liberalize their 
citizenship regimes to include the second and third generation immigrants. As a concluding 
remark, accompanied with language tests and integration courses in most cases, a liberal 
citizenship regime based on the principle of jus soli is the only alternative for third country 
nationals to become equals with the other members of the society they are living in. 
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